It is considered good distributed computing practice to devise object implementations that tolerate contention, periods of asynchrony and a large number of failures, but perform fast if few failures occur, the system is synchronous and there is no contention. This paper initiates the first study of quorum systems that help design such implementations by encompassing, at the same time, optimal resilience (just like traditional quorum systems), as well as optimal best-case complexity (unlike traditional quorum systems).
INTRODUCTION
Quorum systems are powerful mathematical tools to reason about distributed implementations of shared objects including read/write storage (e.g., [3, 21, 29] ) and consensus [6, 10, 24] . In particular, quorum systems have been used to reason about implementations that tolerate asynchrony and are optimally resilient to process failures. Originally, a quorum system was defined as a set of subsets that intersect [12] , and this notion was key to reasoning about crash-resilient asynchronous algorithms. More sophisticated forms of quorum systems have been introduced to cope with Byzantine (malicious) failures [27] : these require larger intersections among subsets (i.e., quorums) [29] .
However, while being very useful to reason about the resilience dimension, traditional quorums (be they simple or Byzantine) are not adequate to capture the complexity dimension, specifically the best-case one. This is particularly important given the appealing nature of optimistic distributed object implementations, e.g., [1, 5, 8, 9, 14, 15, 26, 30, 34, 39] . In addition to being devised to tolerate worst-case conditions, namely a large number of failures, arbitrarily long periods of asynchrony and contention, these implementations are also geared to reduce best-case complexity, i.e., latency under situations of synchrony and no-contention, which are typically argued to be frequent in practice. More specifically, these implementations are tuned to expedite operations in uncontended and synchronous situations, provided "enough" servers are accessed. This very notion of "enough" is not captured by traditional quorum systems and it is natural to seek for a mathematical abstraction that captures it in precise yet general terms.
This paper introduces the notion of refined quorum systems (RQS) . In short, a refined quorum system of some set of elements S is a set of three classes of subsets (quorums) of S: first class quorums are also second class quorums, which are also third class quorums. Quorums (subsets of S) of the first class have large intersections with quorums of other classes, those of the second class typically have smaller intersections with those of the third class, the latter simply correspond to traditional quorums. In the context of a distributed ob-ject implementation, the set S would typically contain the set of fault-prone server processes over which some object abstraction (e.g., storage or consensus) is implemented.
Intuitively, under uncontended and synchronous conditions, a distributed object implementation would expedite an operation if a quorum of the first class is available, then degrade gracefully depending on whether a quorum of the second or the third class is available. We argue that our quorum notion is, in a sense, complete: there is no reason for further refinement of quorums with the goal of optimizing best-case efficiency. Indeed, the properties provided by our third class quorums are anyway necessary for hindering the partitioning of the asynchronous system, which is key to any resilient distributed object implementation. Moreover, and as we show in this paper, optimally resilient and best-case efficient implementations of the seminal register and consensus abstractions have exactly three possible latencies under uncontended and synchronous conditions. This observation is of independent interest.
Our refined quorum systems are designed to handle a general adversary structure in which various subsets of processes can collude to defeat the protocol [20, 22, 29] . With such a general structure, we relax the often criticized assumption in practice, of independent and identically distributed failures, unlike [1, 5, 8, 9, 14, 15, 26, 30, 34, 39] .
We illustrate the power of our notion of refined quorum systems by introducing two new atomic object implementations. Each algorithm is interesting in its own right and is, in a precise sense, the first fully optimal protocol of its kind.
• Our first object implementation is a new Byzantineresilient asynchronous distributed storage algorithm implementing the atomic register abstraction. Such algorithms constitute an active area of research and are appealing alternatives to classical centralized storage systems based on specialized hardware [36] . The challenge when devising distributed storage algorithms is to ensure that reads and writes have low latency in most frequent situations, while (a) tolerating asynchrony and the failures of a large number of base servers (typically commodity disks) as well as any number of clients that access the storage (wait-freedom [18] ) and (b) ensuring strong consistency (ideally atomicity [19, 23] ). Using a refined quorum system, we present an atomic wait-free storage algorithm that combines optimal resilience with the lowest possible read/write latency in best-case conditions (no-contention and synchrony). Under such conditions, our algorithm expedites storage operations (reads and writes) in a single communication round-trip (or simply, round) if a first class quorum is accessed, in two rounds if a second class quorum is accessed and in three rounds otherwise. The latter case is when a third class quorum is available which is a necessary condition for resilience anyway. Our algorithm does not rely on any data authentication primitive, and matches the resilience and complexity lower bounds of [15, 31] (even when these bounds are extended to a general adversary structure), together with a new bound we establish in this paper.
Our new bound captures the best-case complexity of gracefully degrading atomic storage implementations.
• Our second algorithm implements a Byzantine-resilient consensus abstraction in the general state machine replication (SMR) framework of [24] , distinguishing different process roles: proposers that propose values to be learned by learners with the mediation of acceptors. Our algorithm is the first to tolerate (1) any number of Byzantine failures of proposers and learners, (2) the largest possible number of acceptor failures, and (3) arbitrarily long periods of asynchrony. On the other hand, under best-case conditions, our algorithm allows a value to be learned in only two message-delays in case a first class quorum is accessed, and in three (resp., four) message delays in case a second (resp., third) class quorum is accessed. Note here that (a) learning in a single message delay is obviously impossible with multiple or potentially Byzantine proposers, and (b) the availability of a third class quorum is anyway necessary for resilience. Our algorithm matches the resilience and complexity lower bounds of [25] (including when these bounds are extended to a general adversary structure), together with a new complementary bound we establish here on consensus algorithms that degrade gracefully in best-case executions. These bounds state minimal conditions under which the state-machine replication approach can be made optimally resilient and best-case efficient. Until now, it was not clear whether the conditions of [25] were also sufficient. We show they are and we complement them.
We believe that it would have been very hard to devise such algorithms, especially in the context of a general adversary structure, without the notion of a refined quorum system (but we might be subjective).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first presents our quorum notion and illustrates how it generalizes previous ones through examples from the literature. Sections 3 and 4 introduce our two new distributed object implementations that exploit the full features of refined quorums. We conclude the paper by pointing out some open research directions. For space restrictions, we postpone the detailed model as well as the full algorithms and their proofs to the full paper [17] .
REFINED QUORUM SYSTEMS

Definitions
A refined quorum system is expressed in the context of a non-empty set S of elements, and an adversary structure (or, simply, adversary) B defined as follows [20] . Let B be any set of subsets of S. B is an adversary (for S) if:
Let RQS be any set of subsets of S. • ∀Q2 ∈ QC2, ∀Q ∈ RQS, ∀B1, B2 ∈ B:
We simply call elements of a refined quorum systemquorums, and we sometimes refer to any quorum that is not a class 2 quorums as a class 3 quorum (we write QC3 = RQS). Note that class 1 quorums are also class 2 quorums, which are also class 3 quorums. Notice also that, when QC1 = QC2, Property 2 implies Property 3. Furthermore, when k = 0, Property 1 implies Property 3. Therefore, Property 3 is interesting on its own only if k > 0 and QC1 = QC2.
To get an intuition of these properties, we instantiate them here in the context of a k-bounded threshold adversary, denoted Bk . This is a special case of an adversary that contains all subsets of S with cardinality at most k (i.e., Bk = {B|B ⊆ S ∧ |B| ≤ k}). In this context, the RQS properties can be expressed as follows: Property 1. Any two quorums intersect in at least k + 1 elements.
Property 2. The intersection of any two class 1 quorums intersects with any quorum in at least 2k + 1 elements. Property 3. Any class 2 quorum intersects with any quorum in at least 2k+1 elements or this intersection itself intersects with any class 1 quorum in at least k + 1 elements.
Examples
Example 1. Figure 1 depicts a simple illustration of a RQS for the 1-bounded threshold adversary B1: 4 quorums are involved. As depicted by the example, the cardinality of a quorum is not always a good indication of its class: it is the intersection with others that matters. Quorum Q1 contains 5 elements and is a class 1 quorum, while Q contains 6 elements yet is only a class 3 quorum.
In the following, we give more illustrations of our refined quorum system notion by explaining how it extends traditional quorum systems. Later in the paper, we will introduce new optimal algorithms that make full use of our quorum notion. In the following, we consider that an adversary B for a set of processes S contains all subsets of S that can simultaneously be Byzantine. In our description, a process that simply fails by crashing is not called Byzantine. We also denote by Qi the set of subsets of S that contains all 
, Q1} is a refined quorum system, where Q1 (resp., Q2) is a class 1 (resp., class 2) quorum.
subsets of S that contain all but at most i elements of S,
Example 2. Consider the case where:
, every majority of S is a quorum). Property 1 is trivially satisfied. So are Properties 2 and 3, since QC1 = QC2 = ∅. This quorum system is typically used when devising algorithms that tolerate (a minority of) crash-failures, e.g., [3, 6, 12, 24, 32, 37] . . In this case, each quorum contains more than two thirds of processes and satisfies Property 1. Properties 2 and 3 are also satisfied (since QC1 = QC2 = ∅). Such a quorum system is typically used to tolerate (up to one third of) Byzantine failures, e.g., [5, 8, 31, 33] .
Example 4. A refined quorum system for which QC1 = QC2 = ∅ is a disseminating quorum system in the sense of [29] . In [29] , disseminating quorum systems are used to build resilient distributed services that store authenticated (also called self-verifying) data (in short, such data is assumed to be unforgeable). On the other hand, a refined quorum system in which QC1 = ∅ and QC2 = RQS is a masking quorum system in the sense of [29] . These systems have been used to build resilient distributed services that store unauthenticated data.
So far, in examples 2-4, we considered refined quorum systems in which QC1 = ∅. In the rest of the paper, we study the more general case where QC1 = ∅. This is the case where RQS capture both the resilience and the best-case complexity dimensions of distributed algorithms.
Example 5. Consider the case of a refined quorum system where ∅ = QC1 = QC2. Such a RQS corresponds to the quorum system used in [26] for the specific case B = ∅, to devise a consensus algorithm that tolerates asynchronous periods and a threshold t of process (crash) failures, yet ex-pedites decisions in best-case scenarios. In fact, although not used in the algorithm, the idea of a fast quorum (class 1 quorum in our terminology) was used to explain the algorithm. In the special case of an adversary Bk , where (a) RQS = Qt, and (b) QC1 = QC2 = Qq (q ≤ t), Property 2 is satisfied if |S| > 2q + t + 2k and Property 1 is satisfied if |S| > 2t + k. These inequalities correspond to Lamport's lower bounds for "asynchronous" consensus [25] . The special case of this RQS where k = q = t (i.e., where QC1 = RQS) corresponds to the quorum system used in [1, 30] , also with the goal of boosting consensus latency.
Example 6. Even more interesting is the general case where ∅ = QC1 = QC2 ⊆ RQS (e.g., Fig. 1 ), especially when RQS, QC1 and the adversary are defined as in Example 5, QC2 = Qr , and 0 ≤ q < r ≤ t. In other words, each quorum contains all but at most t processes, while class 1 (resp., class 2) quorums contain all but at most q (resp., r) elements. RQS satisfies (i) Property 1 if |S| > 2t + k, (ii) Property 2 if |S| > t + 2k + 2q, and (iii) Property 3 if |S| > t + r + k + min(k, q), i.e., RQS is a refined quorum system if |S| > t+k +max(t, k +2q, r +min(k, q)). This RQS corresponds to the quorum system used in [9, 15] , and later in [39] .
In the following, we describe two new algorithms that make full and explicit use of our abstract notion of RQS. The full algorithms and their correctness proofs are given in the full paper [17] .
ATOMIC STORAGE
We show in this section how to use a refined quorum system to wait-free [18] implement the abstraction of a singlewriter multi-reader (SWMR) atomic [23] storage with optimal resilience and complexity. Optimal resilience means here tolerating the maximal number of server failures while still ensuring wait-freedom in the face of contention and asynchrony (worst-case conditions). On the other hand, optimal complexity in our context means minimal operation latency in periods of synchrony and no-contention (bestcase conditions). Our storage algorithm tolerates Byzantine servers yet does not rely on any data authentication primitive.
2
In the following, and after few preliminaries on the model underlying our storage algorithm, we overview our algorithm and then state its optimality. This includes establishing a new tight bound on the complexity of atomic storage implementations that are optimally resilient.
Preliminaries
A distributed storage (or, simply, storage) can be viewed a read/write abstraction implemented by a finite set of processes called servers, and a distinct, potentially unbounded, set of processes called clients. A process p (client or server) is modeled as an I/O automata [28] . A computation of a process p proceeds in steps. The steps include communication and local steps. For simplicity, we assume that a correct process performs local steps in negligible time w.r.t to communication steps. A correct process p is one that executes an infinite number of steps. A process fails by crashing if it executes a finite number of steps. We say that a process is benign if it is correct or fails by crashing. A process is Byzantine if it is not benign. We define an execution of a storage algorithm in the vein of [28] (we discuss few model differences in the full paper [17] ).
We assume asynchronous (no bound on communication delays), yet reliable point-to-point channels relating clients and servers (servers do not communicate among each other). We assume a global clock that is, however, not accessible to the processes. We say that the system is synchronous during time interval [t, t ] if for every two correct processes p1 and p2, every message sent by p1 at time t1 ∈ [t, t ] is received by a process p2 at time t1 + Δ ∈ [t, t ], where the constant Δ (Δ > 0) is known to all correct processes.
The set clients is a union of two distinct sets: a singleton writer and the set readers. Clients access the storage through two operations: (1) write(v) (invoked by the writer), to write a value v in the storage, and (2) read() (invoked by readers), to read the value from the storage. We assume that the storage is initialized to a special value ⊥, which is not a valid input of a write operation.
An atomic storage provides the illusion of sequential accesses by ensuring the linearizability of read/write operations [19, 23] (when there is no risk of ambiguity we say operation when we should be saying operation execution). We focus on wait-free [18] atomic storage algorithms in which all read/write operations invoked by a correct client eventually complete. We do not explicitly model the invocation and response steps of read/write operations. We simply say that an operation op invoked by the client c is complete if c takes a response step for op. We say that an operation op is uncontended if op is not concurrent with any write operation. Moreover, we say that op is synchronous if the system is synchronous during the interval between the invocation and completion of op. No client c invokes a new operation before all operations previously invoked by c have completed.
Algorithm
Denoting the set of servers by S, and the adversary by B, we construct a refined quorum system RQS (obeying the properties defined in Section 2) known to all clients. We denote by Bex the set of all Byzantine servers in execution ex. We assume that, for any execution ex, Bex ∈ B. Moreover, in any execution, any number of clients and servers may fail by crashing, as long as there is at least one quorum in RQS that contains only correct servers.
Our algorithm is round-based (as in [2, 3] ), i.e., each operation op (read or write) proceeds in series of communication round-trips (or, simply, rounds). In such algorithms, in each round of op, (a) a client c sends a message to some (possibly to all) servers, (b) a server, on receiving a message from c, responds to c without waiting for any other message and (c) c receives a response from some subset of servers (the decision on when a client proceeds to the next round is algorithmspecific). No other messages are exchanged; in particular, servers can send only response messages to clients. (See the full paper [17] for more details).
We express the latency (complexity) of an operation op in terms of the number of rounds elapsed between the invocation and the completion of op. 
history Our storage algorithm is (m, QCm )-fast for all m ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Note that this implies that, in our algorithm, all synchronous and uncontended operations complete in at most 3 rounds.
The (simplified) pseudocode of the algorithm is given in Figure 2 (the full version is in [17] ). The write (lines 1-11) consists of at most 3 rounds. In every round, the writer awaits replies from some quorum, and in the first two rounds, awaits for a timeout set to 2 * Δ. Upon reception of a wr message containing a timestamp ts, a value v, a set of quorums QC 2 and a round number j, a server si stores this data in its history matrix Hi, by storing v and QC 2 into the variable Hi[ts, j]. 3 The read code is more involved. At its heart lies a BestCase Detector abstraction (BCD, lines 20-21). Roughly, 3 To simplify our algorithm, we assume that servers store the entire history of the shared storage they are implementing. In fact, in our model, achieving atomic semantics (and even a weaker, regular [23] one) while precluding servers from storing the entire history, is unfeasible without using some non-trivial signalling scheme between readers and the writer [2, 7] . These techniques (e.g., [15] ) are orthogonal to our latency efficient scheme based on RQS and integrating them here might obfuscate the point of this paper.
BCD examines quorum intersections to detect synchronous and uncontended reads.
A reader first invokes series of rounds (30-34) until some timestamp/value pair c = ts, v is safe, i.e., is confirmed in the history of some subset of servers S / ∈ B, such that all values v with a ts > ts are invalid. A sufficient condition for a pair ts , v to become invalid is that the last response of any quorum contains only values with timestamps smaller than ts (or a pair ts , v = v ). 4 This holds at the end of the first round of any synchronous and uncontended read (in the following, we consider such a read rd). In this case, lines 30-34 are executed only once.
Then, the reader queries BCD. Assume the last write that precedes the read rd completed in j rounds writing v with timestamp ts. If the reader receives replies from a class 1 quorum in round 1, then BCD( ts, v , 1, j) holds (line 20) and rd completes at the end of round 1 (line 40). Else, if the reader receives replies from some class 2 quorum Q2, then the set X = BCD( ts, v , 2, j) is non-empty (since Q2 ∈ X) and rd proceeds to round 2. In round 2, the reader writesback (line 42) the information about the set X and the pair ts, v to servers and awaits for replies from some quorum from X in round 2. If no quorum from X replies, then the second round of writeback is invoked (line 44). Note that the read takes at most 2 rounds after line 34, so an uncontended and synchronous read rd always completes in at most 3 rounds.
Optimality
Consider the space of round-based storage algorithms. Let Q be any set of subsets of the set of servers S. We say that an algorithm A is (Q, B )-atomic, if A wait-free implements an atomic SWMR storage despite the adversary B provided that in every execution of A, there is a set Q ∈ Q that contains only correct servers. Moreover, denote by P 3(Q (1) ,Q (2) ,Q (3) ) (resp., P 1(Q (3) ); P 2(Q (1) ,Q (3) )) the property obtained from Property 3 (resp., Property 1; Property 2) of Definition 1 by replacing QCi with Q (i) , for i = 1 . . . 3. The minimality of our RQS is captured via the following three theorems.
Theorem 1. If an algorithm A is (Q (3) , B)-atomic, then
P 1(Q (3) ) holds. Theorem 2. If a (Q (3) , B)-atomic algorithm A is (1, Q (1) )- fast, then P 2(Q (1) ,Q (3) ) holds.
Theorem 3. If a (Q (3) , B)-atomic algorithm A is both
Together, Theorems 1-3 convey the optimal resilience and best-case complexity of our algorithm of Figure 2 . Theorems 1 and 2 have been established for the special case of threshold-based quorums and with an implicit notion of quorums in [31] and [15] , respectively. It is not difficult to extend these bounds to non-threshold quorums and the general adversary structure. Here we prove the novel Theorem 3, which is particularly interesting due to the unusual or condition that appears in Property 3 of RQS. (3) , B)-atomic storage algorithm that is both (1, Q (1) )-fast (for some Q (1) = ∅) and (2, Q (2) )-fast, if Property 3 of RQS is violated. Assume by contradiction that such a storage algorithm A exists even if Property 3 of RQS is violated. Consider a simple SWMR storage algorithm with a single writer w and two distinct readers w = r1 = r2 = w. In the following, we denote by X the set S \ X, where X is any subset of the set of servers S. Negating P 3(Q (1) ,Q (2) ,Q (3) ) yields (having in mind Q (1) = ∅):
Proof. Theorem 3 states that there is no (Q
In the following, we denote the set Q2 ∩Q∩Q1 by B0 (note that B0 ∈ B). Since B0 ⊆ Q2 ∩ Q and B is an adversary for S, we may assume, without loss of generality, that B0 ⊆ B1.
To exhibit a contradiction, we construct several partial executions (sketched in Figure 3 ) of the algorithm A including one in which atomicity is violated. More specifically, in this particular partial execution, a read operation returns a value that was never written.
• Let ex1 be the execution in which all servers from Q2 are correct, while all others (i.e., those from Q2) fail by crashing at the beginning of the execution. Furthermore, let wr1 be the write operation invoked at time t1 by the correct writer w in ex1 to write a value v1 = ⊥ in the storage. Moreover, assume that the system is synchronous in ex1. Hence, wr1 is synchronous and uncontended. Since A is (2, Q (2) )-fast, wr1 completes in ex1, say at time t 1 , in at most two communication rounds, after the writer receives the replies in round 2 from servers from Q2.
• Let ex 1 be the partial execution that ends at t 1 , such that ex 1 is identical to ex1 up to time t 1 , except that in ex 1 servers from Q2 do not crash, but, due to asynchrony, messages sent by the writer to servers in Q2 are not delivered by the end of ex 1 (we say these messages are in transit in ex 1 ). Since the writer cannot distinguish ex 1 from ex1, wr1 completes in ex 1 , in two communication rounds, at time t 1 .
• Let the partial execution ex2 extend ex 1 such that: (1) servers from Q1 crash at t 1 , (2) rd1 is a synchronous read operation invoked by the correct reader r1 after t 1 , and (3) no other operation is invoked (hence, rd1 is uncontended). Since A is (1, Q (1) )-fast, rd1 completes in a single round (since a set Q1 of servers is correct) at time t2 and returns v1. Moreover, let ex2 end at t2. All messages that were in transit in ex 1 remain in transit in ex2.
• Let ex 2 be the partial execution identical to ex2 except that in ex 2 servers from Q1 do not crash, but, due to asynchrony, the message sent from r1 to servers in Q1 during rd1 remains in transit in ex 2 . Since r1 and all servers, except those from Q1, cannot distinguish ex 2 from ex2, rd1 completes in ex 2 in a single round, at time t2, and returns v1.
• Let ex 2 be the partial execution identical to ex 2 except that, in ex 2 : (1) the writer crashes during wr1 and its round 2 messages are not received by any server from Q1 ∪ Q2 (i.e., only servers from Q1 ∪ Q2 receive the round 2 message from the writer). Note that all servers from the set B2 ∪(B1 \B0) belong to Q1 and, hence, do not receive a round 2 message from the writer. Since r1 and all servers, except those from Q1 ∩ Q2, cannot distinguish ex 2 from ex 2 , rd1 completes in ex 2 at time t2 and returns v1.
• Consider now a partial execution ex3 slightly different from ex 2 in which the writer (resp., the reader r1) crashes during the round 1 of wr1 (resp., rd1) such that the round 1 messages sent by the writer (resp., r1) in wr1 (resp., rd1) are received only by the servers from the set B2 (resp., Q ∩ Q2 ∩ Q1). We refer to the state of the servers that belong to the set B2 after sending the reply to the round 1 message of wr1 as to σ1. In ex3, all servers are correct except those from the set Q that fail by crashing at the beginning of the partial execution ex3. Assume that the writer crashes at time t f ailw and that r1 crashes at time t f ailr > t f ailw . Let rd2 be a read operation invoked by the correct reader r2 = r1 at time t 3 > max(t f ailr , t2). Since all servers from the set Q are correct in ex3 and A is a (Q (3) , B)-atomic storage algorithm, rd2 eventually completes, at some point in time t3, after n communication rounds and returns the value vR.
• Let ex4 be a partial execution identical to ex 2 except that in ex4: (1) a read operation rd2 is invoked by the correct reader r2 at t 3 (as in ex3), (2) due to asynchrony all messages sent by the servers from Q to r2 are delayed until after t3 (i.e., until after n th round of rd2) and (3) in ex4, all servers from B1 (and B0, since B0 ⊆ B1) are Byzantine: these servers forge their state at time t2 to σ0 (the initial state of servers); otherwise, servers from B1 obey the protocol (including with respect to the writer and the reader r1). Note that r2 and the servers from Q \ B1 = B2 ∪ (Q ∩ Q2) cannot distinguish ex4 from ex3 and, hence, rd2 completes in ex4 at time t3 (as in ex3) and returns vR. On the other hand, r1 cannot distinguish ex4 from ex 2 . Hence, rd1 completes in a single round and returns v1. By atomicity, since rd1 precedes rd2, vR must equal v1.
• Consider now the partial execution ex5, identical to ex3, except that in ex5: (1) wr1 is never invoked, (2) servers from B2 are Byzantine in ex5 and forge their state to σ1 (see ex3); otherwise, servers from B2 send the same messages as in ex3, and (3) servers from Q do not crash in ex5, but, due to asynchrony, all messages sent from servers from Q to r2 are delayed until after t3 (i.e., n th round of rd2). The reader r2 and the servers from Q \ B2 = B1 ∪ (Q ∩ Q2) cannot distinguish ex5 from ex3, so rd2 completes at time t3 and returns vR, i.e., v1 (see ex4). However, by atomicity, in ex5, rd2 must return ⊥, the initial value of the atomic storage. Since v1 = ⊥, ex5 violates atomicity.
CONSENSUS
In our storage algorithm, we assumed that (1) processes that access a RQS (the clients) might crash but cannot be Byzantine, and (2) processes that form a RQS (servers) do not communicate directly with each other. In this section, we illustrate the case where (1) the processes accessing a RQS might be Byzantine and (2) processes that form a RQS may directly communicate. Namely, we consider the consensus problem in the general framework of [24] , composed of three sets of processes: proposers, acceptors and learners. Roughly, proposers propose values that are to be agreed upon by learners, where the role of acceptors is to help learners reach the decision. In this paper, as in [38] , we assume that the set acceptors does not intersect with the set proposers ∪ learners.
The consensus algorithm we present tolerates Byzantine failures of processes and unbounded periods of asynchrony. In fact, it is the first consensus algorithm that tolerates an unbounded number of Byzantine proposers and learners. The algorithm is optimal in terms of resilience as well as complexity, matching the lower bounds of [25] .
5 Our algorithm expedites the consensus decision under best-case conditions without using data authentication primitives; however, when best-case conditions are not met, data authentication primitives are used.
Many of the modeling concepts used in this section are borrowed from the previous one (Section 3.1). So we do no recall them here. We assume that every proposer p is initialized with a single proposal value and all processes are interconnected with point-to-point communication channels. 
Algorithm
Our algorithm relies on acceptors forming a refined quorum system RQS for an adversary B, such that RQS is known to all processes. Consensus safety (i.e., Validity and Agreement) is guaranteed as long as the set of Byzantine acceptors in any execution belongs to B, while consensus liveness (i.e., Termination) is ensured if there is a correct quorum of acceptors Qc ∈ RQS and if the system is eventually synchronous [10] (this is crucial to circumvent the impossibility of [11] ). Any number of proposers and learners can be Byzantine. We denote by m an unauthenticated message, and by m σx the message digitally signed [35] by process x.
We say that an execution ex is a best-case execution if, in ex: (1) there is no contention, i.e., (a) all proposers are benign and (b) exactly one proposer p proposes, say some value v at time t (and p is correct) and (2) the system is synchronous (during [t, t + 4Δ]). Let P be any set of subsets of acceptors.
Definition 3. (m, P )-fast consensus algorithm. We say that a consensus algorithm is (m, P )-fast if in every best-case execution ex in which some set P ∈ P contains only correct acceptors, all correct learners learn v in m + 1 message delays, without using authenticated messages.
Our consensus algorithm is (m, QCm )-fast for all m ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The algorithm consists of two modules: (1) a Locking module (Fig. 4 ) that ensures safety, and (2) an Election module 7 for liveness. The algorithm proceeds in a sequence of views. In every view, a single proposer is the leader, except in the initial view (initV iew) where all proposers can be seen as leaders (we assume that all acceptors are initially in initV iew). The Locking module consists of a consult (lines 1-6 and 11-20, Fig. 4 ) and an update phase (lines 7, 21-28 and 31-34 Fig. 4) . In initV iew, the leader, on proposing a value, skips the consult phase and executes immediately the update phase.
Roughly, in a best-case execution, the update phase proceeds as follows: (1) the proposer p sends a message m = prepare containing its proposal value v and view number view = initV iew to all acceptors (line 7, Fig. 4 ), (2) correct acceptor aj , upon receiving m that contains the value v and view number view, performs some local computations (we say aj prepares the value v in view -line 22, Fig. 4) , and then echoes v and view using a update 1 message to all acceptors and learners (lines 23, Fig. 4 ), (3) correct acceptor aj , upon receiving update 1 messages from some quorum Q performs again some local computations (we say aj 1-updates the value v in view with quorum Q) and send update 2 messages along with the id of Q to all acceptors and learners (lines 25-28, Fig. 4) , and (4) acceptors, similarly to step (3), upon receiving update 2 from some quorum, 2-update the value v in view and send update 3 to all acceptors (this is however done only once, and not per every quorum of received update messages, as is the case with 1-updating the value). If some class 1 (resp., class 2, class 3) quorum contains only correct acceptors, then all correct learners and acceptors decide v in initV iew after two (resp., three, four) message delays (line 31 (resp., 32, 33), Fig. 4 ). Since learners learn a value upon deciding it (line 34), we ensure that our algorithm is (m,QCm )-fast for all m ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
In a best-case execution, the Election module, responsible for view changes, does not change the view before all correct learners learn v. However, if the proposer p is Byzantine, or the system is asynchronous, then the Election module might designate a different proposer pw to be the leader for the new view w (line 8, Fig. 4 ). Process pw starts the consult phase for view number w by sending the new view message to acceptors (line 2, Fig. 4) . Then, pw waits for a quorum Q of valid signed new view ack messages (or, simply, acks -line 3) containing the last prepared and stepupdated values (where step ∈ {1, 2}) and the corresponding view numbers. We say that an ack is valid if the following conditions holds (for step ∈ {1, 2}) (1) if an acceptor aj reports that it step-updated some value v in view , then aj also reports that it prepared v in view , or some other value in a view higher than view , and (2) the last values step-updated in some view view are accompanied with a set of corresponding signed update step messages from some subset of acceptors that is not an element of B (obtained in lines 13-17, Fig. 4) . 8 Then, the leader evaluates acks from Q using the choose() function (line 5, Fig. 4 ). 
Optimality
We say that an algorithm A implements (Q,B)-consensus if A ensures consensus Validity and Agreement, as long as, for any execution ex of A, the set of acceptors Byzantine in ex belongs to B, as well as Termination in case the system is eventually synchronous and there is a set Q ∈ Q that contains only correct acceptors. In addition, analogously to Section 3.3, we define the properties P 1(Q (3) ), P 2(Q (1) ,Q
and P 3(Q (1) ,Q (2) ,Q (3) ), where Q (i) is some set of subsets of acceptors. The following theorems capture the minimality of our RQS, assuming |proposers| ≥ 2 and |learners| ≥ 3. 
In the special threshold case, where (a) B=Bk, (b) all elements of Q (1) (resp., Q (3) ) contain all but at most q (resp., t) acceptors, and (c) q = t−2k, Theorems 4-5 reduce to the lower bounds stated in [25] . In the full paper [17] we prove the novel optimality result established by Theorem 6.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper introduces the notion of refined quorum systems (RQS) and argues that this is a useful notion to reason about optimally resilient and efficient distributed object implementations assuming general adversary structures. We show that refined quorum systems are necessary and sufficient (or, in a sense, minimal) for implementing an important class of atomic objects, namely atomic storage and consensus. This minimality holds when we indeed require atomicity and do not rely on authentication primitives to cope with Byzantine failures in best-case executions.
Roughly speaking, denoting the best possible latency of an object implementation by l1 10 (i.e., 1 round in the case of storage, or 2 message delays in the case of (Byzantine and asynchronous [25] ) consensus), and by l2 and l3, incrementally, the next best possible latencies according to the corresponding metric, we proposed two RQS-based object implementations that achieve a latency of li whenever a quorum of class i is available and best-case conditions (namely, synchrony and no-contention) are met. Since Property 1 of RQS (defined on class 3 quorums) is anyway necessary for proof obtaining" technique of [5] . 9 We exclude here the special cases where |proposers| = 1, |learners| ≤ 2 or acceptors ∩ (proposers ∪ learners) = ∅). These have to be addressed separately. 10 This can be measured by the best possible latency in synchronous, uncontended and failure-free situations.
any resilient implementation of distributed storage and consensus in an asynchronous environment, there is no need for refining quorums further.
It might be important to notice here that the very notion of a refined quorum system helps highlight the information structure of optimally resilient and best-case efficient atomic object implementations (at least those implementing the abstractions of atomic storage or consensus). Basically, these implementations go through at most three "rounds" in bestcase conditions and fall into a backup subprotocol in case of asynchrony or contention. A novel algorithmic scheme we used in both algorithms consists of appending the ids of (class 2) quorums, to written/proposed values. This is key to combining graceful degradation (i.e., achieving both latencies l1 and l2) with optimal resilience.
Our study opens several research directions. For example, it is intriguing to determine: (a) the load and availability of RQS [32] , (b) how RQS can be optimally placed in the network [13] , (c) how many RQS can be found given some adversary structure, (d) how to devise algorithms that cope with unknown RQS/adversary structures, and (e) how RQS can be expressed in frameworks for tolerating nonindependent and identically distributed (non-IID) failures, other than general adversary structures (in particular, in the core/survivor framework of [22] ).
Moreover, it would be interesting to carefully look into non-atomic semantics, e.g., regular or safe storage [23] . Recent results (in the threshold-based context) suggest that some (yet not all) properties of our RQS are necessary and sufficient even for achieving optimal best-case complexity of weaker object implementations. Namely [2, 16] suggest that Properties 1 and 3a of RQS are necessary and sufficient for characterizing non-atomic best-case efficient storage implementations. These properties correspond to the special case of RQS where QC1 = ∅. Finally, it would also be interesting to look into atomic object implementations that use authentication in best-case executions. The lower bounds of [25] , stated in the threshold-based context, suggest that Properties 1 and 2 are necessary and sufficient for characterizing best-case efficient and optimally resilient consensus implementations regardless of whether authentication is used in the best-case. These properties correspond to the special case of RQS where QC2 = QC1.
